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PERSPECTIVES
Between a Rock and a Hard Place-
The United States, the International
Court, and the Nicaragua Case**
In June 1986 the International Court handed down one of its most
important judgments in forty years. It was certainly the most important
for the United States. According to some observers, the decision was the
best that the Court has delivered, and under difficult circumstances too.
According to others, the decision was the worst in the history of the
Court, one that was bound to destroy the Court as an authoritative judicial
institution. I Both sides would agree, however, that the Nicaragua decision 2
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I. For thorough background discussions (and contrasting points of view) on the content
and importance of the Nicaragua case, see Almond, The Military Activities Case: New
Perspectives on the International Court of Justice and Global Public Order, 21 INT'L LAW.
195 (1987); Rowles, Nicaragua v. United States: Issues of Law and Policy, 20 INT'L LAW.
1245 (1986); see also the broad variety of views on the Nicaragua case, in Appraisals of
the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits) 81 A.J.I.L. 77 (1987) (including
comments by: Herbert W. Briggs, Francis A. Boyle, Gordon A. Christenson, Anthony
D'Amato, Richard Falk, Tom J. Farer, Thomas M. Franck, Michael J. Glennon, Edward
Gordon, John Lawrence Hargrove, Mark Weston Janis, Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., John Norton
Moore, Fred L. Morrison, W. Michael Reisman and Fernando R. Tes6n).
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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was, without question, the most important case that the Court has decided
in a long, long, time. 3
The case presented a number of novel, sensitive, and difficult issues to
the Court. It was a case of first impression, both in fact and in law.
Nicaragua had accused the United States of using force against it, both
by direct attacks (such as the mining of Nicaragua's harbors) 4 and by the
direct and indirect support of armed insurgencies within Nicaragua.5 It
claimed as violations of international law the economic boycott of Nic-
aragua by the United States, 6 overflights of Nicaragua by United States
military aircraft, 7 and the conduct of military maneuvers close to the
Nicaraguan border.8 Nicaragua also claimed that the preparation of writ-
ten manuals and materials for the insurgent Contras by agents of the
United States constituted a violation of international humanitarian law.9
These various claims were founded on the United Nations Charter,'0 on
various other multilateral treaties. I and on "general and customary in-
ternational law."1 2 The Nicaragua case possesses important long-range
implications for both the United States and the Court.
There is always difficulty with true separation between international
law and international politics. After all, it is States that are the actors in
international law, the world being their stage. Their actions and interac-
tions are by their very definition political. These comments, however, are
3. In terms of the finding of the law and the ordering of procedures it is possibly more
significant than any other case ever decided, ranking with the Lotus case, the Silesia cases
and Chorz w Factory, the Corfu Channel case, the South West Africa cases, and the Hostages
case. The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); German Interests
in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.) (Jurisdiction), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug. 25);
German Interests in Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 73 (Merits); German
Interest in Polish Upper Silesia and the Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.) (Jurisdiction),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (July 26); (Interim Protection), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12
(Order of Nov. 21); (Interpretation), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13 (Dec. 16); (Indemnity),
1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13); (Expert Enquiry), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17
(Order of Sept. 13); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), Merits, 1949 l.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Assessment
of Amount of Compensation, 1949 I.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.;
Liberia v. S. Aft.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21); Second Phase, 1966
I.C.J. 6 (July 18); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
4. Nicaragua case, 1986 i.C.J. at 45-48, paras, 75-80.
5. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 48-65, paras. 81-116.
6. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 69-70, paras. 123-25.
7. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 51-53, paras. 87-91.
8. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 53, para. 92.
9. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 65-69, paras. 117-22; and the Geneva Conventions referred
to, id. at 114-15, para. 220.
10. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 92-97, paras. 172-82.
I. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 35-38, paras. 49-56.
12. Id. at 18-20, para. 15 & at 92-106, paras. 172-201.
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intended to be legal, and not political in nature. They should be interpreted
as professional legal commentary from an international lawyer who is
concerned, as all of us must be, about the present state of international
law in the light of the Nicaragua decision.
I. Nonappearance and Disappearance
The whole context of the Nicaragua case was highly abnormal. The
United States walked out of the Court after the jurisdictional decision
was rendered but before the merits phase got under way. 13 This action
was unprecedented in the history of either Court. 14 No other State-not
even South Africa in the South West Africa cases 15-had ever walked out
after losing on jurisdiction but before arguing the merits. The U.S. non-
appearance, which could more aptly be described as a "disappearance,"
has profound implications for what many still perceive as the United
States' position as a world leader.
First and foremost, the disappearance of the United States from the
courtroom in January 1985 created the inescapable implication that the
United States had no confidence in its own case. It destroyed public
confidence in the affirmative defense by the United States, of "collective
self-defense." It rang hollow: how could a party walk away from a fight
that it asserted it must so clearly and obviously win? This impression was
unfortunately reinforced by an unsuccessful last-ditch attempt by the
United States in April 1984, on the very eve of Nicaragua's filing its
complaint, to oust the Court of jurisdiction by withdrawing from the
jurisdiction of the Court concerning Central America. 16
13. See Department of State, United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the
Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); the Statement was supported by Observations on the
International Court of Justice's November 26, 1984 Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admis-
sibility in the Case of Nicaragua v. United States of America," 24 I.L.M. at 249.
14. See Highet, Litigation Implications of the U.S. Withdrawalfrom the Nicaragua Case,
79 A.J.I.L. 992 (1985).
15. Supra note 2.
16. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States)
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 415-21,
paras. 52-65 (Nov. 26). The attempt to withdraw was unsuccessful because it was untimely
filed: the U.S. declaration on its face required a six-months' notice period before termination
of the jurisdictional clause. 39 I.C.J. Y.B. 99, 100 (1985). This impression was also confirmed
by a general withdrawal by the United States on October 7, 1985, from compulsory juris-
diction under the "optional clause" of the Court's Statute, which provides for the jurisdiction
of the Court over a wide possibility of subjects in the absence of special treaty and on the
condition of reciprocity. Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination
of Acceptance of i.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, Oct. 7, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742
(1985). The "optional clause" is found in Statute of the International Court of Justice, art.
36, para. 2, (and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice). It provides
that:
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In consequence, the United States was required to assert that its defense
was strong, but that the forum was inappropriate, biased and inhospitable.
Thus, the United States commented on "the impression that the Court
is determined to find in favor of Nicaragua in this case." 17 Criticism by
the United States on the jurisdictional decision came perilously close to
hyperbole; it even suggested that the Court lacked integrity: "We will not
risk U.S. national security by presenting such sensitive material in public
or before a Court that includes two judges from Warsaw Pact nations." 18
The disappearance also rendered a certain type of decision all but in-
evitable: once the United States had disappeared, the Court possessed
no real alternatives in certain important respects. It was the decision to
"disappear" that forced the Court to structure the Nicaragua decision
in several ways; the irony is that these aspects are now the most likely
targets for criticism by the United States.
In a nutshell: the United States brought its present difficulties with the
Court on itself. 19
i. Effect of the Affirmative Defense of the United States
The United States did not in any meaningful way controvert or deny
most of the factual charges in the Nicaragua case during the jurisdiction
phase of the case or otherwise. To the contrary, what it did was to allege
an affirmative defense: that of the exercise of the "inherent right of in-
2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of
reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time.
For a useful discussion of the optional clause and the United States' action in withdrawing
jurisdiction thereunder, see T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 24-33 (1986).
17. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 13, at 248.
18. Id. (emphasis added). This last comment received the stinging rebuke it deserved,
most notably in the separate opinions of Judge Lachs, 1986 I.C.J. at 158-60, who, in spite
of his judicial distinction and intellectual independence unfortunately was one of the targets
of the implications in the United States' suggestion, and of Sir Robert Jennings, an innocent
bystander, id. at 528.
19. One is necessarily reminded of what Hans and Fritz, in the brilliant 1930s-1940s comic
strip called The Katzenjammer Kids, used to tell Momma and Poppa after their mischievous
cousin Rollo had, once again, found himself in a predicament of his own making: "He
brought it on himself." This is a less elegant version of Shakespeare's oft-quoted: "For 'tis
the sport to have the engineer / Hoist with his own petard." (Hamlet, Act 111, Scene 4, I.
206.)
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dividual or collective self-defense" under article 51 of the Charter. 20 Al-
though the United States was not present in Court in the second phase
of the proceedings to argue that defense on the merits, it had been made
clear during the earlier phase of the proceedings 2 1 and was fully taken
into account by the Court. 22
The right of self-defense so alleged was of course asserted in relation
to justifying the various actions complained of by Nicaragua, which were
alleged to be in response to the aggressive behavior of Nicaragua toward
her neighbors, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. The right sought
to be exercised was "collective" and not "individual" in that the United
States was asserting that its actions were on behalf of its Central American
allies.
What happens to an affirmative defense, however, when the party re-
lying on it refuses to appear in Court and present evidence on the issue?
Article 53 of the Statute was specifically designed to take care of instances
when a party was absent from proceedings before the Court, and requires
the Court to satisfy itself that the plaintiff's (the "applicant's") case is
"well founded in fact and in law.' 23 Yet how can the Court seriously be
expected to advance and evaluate every argument and counter-case that
might have been raised by the respondent if it had been present?
The Court noted repeatedly in its opinion that there was no evidence-
or at least insufficient evidence-before it to support various assertions
that had been made by the United States, including specifically a residual
defensive charge of Nicaraguan aggression against El Salvador.24 To com-
pound the problem, El Salvador (which had failed to renew its earlier
application to intervene in the Nicaragua case) was not present in Court
to produce evidence 2 5 that, no doubt, would have gone to the heart of
20. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .
U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
21. See the Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America, Aug. 17, 1984,
in Nicaragua (Jurisdiction), 1984 I.C.J. at 515-19, paras. 189-219.
22. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 102-06, paras. 193-201.
23. U.N.CHARTER art. 53 reads:
I. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend
its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in
accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact
and law. (Emphasis added.)
24. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 70-86, paras. 126-160, especially para. 160. See the
dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, id. at 240-41, para. 61, and examples given; see also id.
at 46, para. 76, at 56, para. 85, at 65-66, para. 117, at 70, para. 125, at 87-88, para. 165
(contra comments in the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, id. at 323, para. 134), at
119-21, paras, 231-33, at 141, para. 282.
25. Yugoslavia, not a party to the Corfu Channel case, produced evidence for the Court
to consider in 1947. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 17, (Apr. 9).
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the matter; it was, after all, largely in response to alleged Nicaraguan
aggression against El Salvador that the United States had invoked the
"inherent right of . . . collective self-defense" under article 51 of the
Charter.
And yet, with the United States absent, in what form of proceedings
would El Salvador have been seeking to intervene? Had El Salvador's
application been granted, it would eventually have found itself in an im-
possible quandary: it would have become a "quasi-respondent," alone at
the counsel table without its "champion," the United States, 26 bearing
an unacceptably heavy burden of responsibility as to the outcome of the
case against that champion.
Much of the criticism to be leveled at the Court's judgment will no
doubt concern its handling of the facts. It doubtless will be said by the
United States and others that the Court misconstrued the voluminous and
complex facts before it; was proceeding with an incomplete or one-sided
dossier; and did not properly test the evidence before it. When viewed
from the Court's perspective, however, what a bitter irony. How could
the evidence before it be complete, in the absence of the defending State?
How could the Court have a complete dossier? How could the Court fully
test the evidence before it? 27
The Court adopted several new approaches to cope with the one-
sidedness of the situation. First, the Court relied upon inference and de-
ductive reasoning more obviously than it had ever done before. Second,
the Court placed substantial reliance on a form ofjudicial notice of matters
in the public record28 or facts described in press reports that had not been
26. To borrow the felicitous word used by Judge Sir Robert Jennings, 1986 I.C.J. at 545.
27. See Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 A.J.I.L. 1 (1987),
especially at 1-5, 49-51.
28. The Hostages case (United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 9-10, paras. 12 & 13 (May 24)). See also the comments by Judge Jessup,
at page x of his introduction to D.V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRI-
BUNALS (rev. ed. 1975), with respect to the Court's use of extra-judicial public knowledge
relating to French intentions in the Nuclear Tests case (Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; NZ v.
Fr.)), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec. 20). The Court referred to its decision in the Hostages case,
1980 1.C.J. at 9, para. 12: "The Court [there] referred to facts which 'are, for the most part,
matters of public knowledge which have received extensive coverage in the world press
and in radio and television broadcasts from Iran and other countries' " and proceeded to
state that:
The Court has however to show particular caution in this area. Widespread reports of
a fact may prove on closer examination to derive from a single source, and such reports,
however numerous, will in such case have no greater value as evidence than the original
source. It is with this important reservation that the newspaper reports supplied to the
Court should be examined in order to assess the facts of the case, and in particular to
ascertain whether such facts were matters of public knowledge.
(Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 41, para. 63; see also id. at 53, para. 92 & at 65-66, para.
117; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, id. at 317, para. 120 & at 324, paras,
138-39). See Highet, supra note 27, at 39-40.
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denied by responsible officials of the State chargeable with those facts. 29
In this regard, the Court developed a somewhat novel, but quite sensible,
theory of evaluation of public official statements: it accepted them as true,
as a form of admission, when made by a governmental official against the
interest of the State of which that person was an official, 30 but discounted
them as possibly self-serving when made in its favor.3 1 This double-edged
approach was applied to statements made by officials both of the United
States and of Nicaragua.
These approaches constitute the most significant evolution in the Court's
methods of dealing with questions of fact since its use of circumstantial
evidence in the Corfu Channel case in 1949.32 In that case Albania was
held liable by the application of circumstantial evidence, in the absence
29. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 87, paras. 163-64; at 50, para. 84; at 51-52, paras. 88-
89. (In discussing press reports attributing certain overflights to the United States, the Court
stated that it was "not however aware of any specific denial of these flights by the United
States Government," id. at 52, para. 89); but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel,
id. at 317, para. 120 & at 326-31, paras. 145-53. See Highet, supra note 27, at 40.
30. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 41, para. 64 (emphasis added). A refusal to comment
was treated as an admission, id., at 49, para. 83 ("In the view of the Court, the President's
refusal to comment on the connection between covert activities and 'what has been going
on, or with some of the specific operations down there' can, in its context, be treated as
an admission that the United States had something to do with the Corinto attack, but not
necessarily that United States personnel were directly involved." (Emphasis added.)) Pres-
idential statements were also used in a corroborative sense, id. at 47, para. 78; at 50, para.
86; at 68, para. 121; at 71-73, paras. 128 and 131; at 79-82, paras. 144-51. See Highet, supra
note 27, at 36-38.
31. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 41, para. 65:
However, it is natural also that the Court should treat such statements [made by
high officials of the States concerned] with caution, whether the official statement
was made by an authority of the Respondent or of the Applicant. Neither Article 53
of the Statute, nor any other ground, could justify a selective approach, which would
have undermined the consistency of the Court's methods and its elementary duty to
ensure equality between the Parties. The Court must take account of the manner in
which the statements were made public; evidently, it cannot treat them as having the
same value irrespective of whether the text is to be found in an official national or
international publication, or in a book or newspaper. It must also take note whether
the text of the official statement in question'appeared in the language used by the
author or on the basis of a translation (cf. I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 10, para. 13). It
may also be relevant whether or not such a statement was brought to the Court's
knowledge by official communications filed in conformity with the relevant require-
ments of the Statute and Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Court has inevitably had
sometimes to interpret the statements, to ascertain precisely to what degree they
constituted acknowledgements of a fact.
See also id. at 43, paras. 69 & 70; this principle was applied inter alia to the affidavit of
Secretary of State Shultz that had been annexed to the Counter-Memorial of the United
States: id. at 71-72, para. 128: "In connection with this declaration, the Court would recall
the observations it has already made . .. as to the evidential value of declarations by
ministers of the government of a State engaged in litigation concerning an armed conflict."
But see the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, id. at 271-72, para. 14 & Factual Appendix
Part G, id. at 410-11, para. 27. See Highet, supra note 27, at 38-39.
32. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
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of any forthcoming explanation, for the presence in its territorial waters
of armed mines that caused loss of life and severe damage to two Royal
Navy destroyers on a post-war patrol. 33
III. Effect of the Multilateral Treaty
Reservation of the United States
Courts unquestionably benefit from hearing both sides of an argument.
The International Court of Justice is no exception. Indeed, it can be said
that that Court benefits even more than most others from the presentation
of arguments by both sides, if only because the subject-matter of disputes
before it tends to be very complex and the written pleadings extraordi-
narily lengthy.34 In order to steer the judges through the thickets of the
written arguments and to refine the issues before the Court, participation
in the oral proceedings is essential.
In the Nicaragua case the issues presented were complex and wide-
ranging. They included allegations of breach by the United States of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter, and under customary in-
ternational law (separate and independent from the Charter). 35 These
obligations include the nonuse of force and nonintervention in the internal
affairs of other States. 36 They also include the requirement not to take
action inconsistent with the object and purpose of, and violate provisions
of, the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between
the United States and Nicaragua, which had not been denounced or ter-
minated by the United States. 37 Nicaragua also adduced obligations under
the Charter of the Organization of American States38 and under customary
international law. 39
It was this last submission that won the case for Nicaragua, since the
Court was confronted by a patently absurd dilemma concerning the "Van-
33. See Highet, supra note 27, at 30-32.
34. In most cases it is not unusual to have written pleadings that run to thousands of
pages (there being two and sometimes three "rounds" of such pleadings, and the pleadings
themselves being normally amply endowed with annexes, exhibits, and supporting mate-
rials); there is of course, in the absence of agreement, no formal limitation on the length or
content of the pleadings that can be filed by the parties (which are sovereign States), except
that they must contain submissions and set forth the facts and the law.
35. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 18-20, para. 15.
36. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." See Memorial of Nicaragua of 30 April 1985 in the Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J.
at 114-45, paras. 213-74.
37. Id. at 196-223, paras. 376-433.
38. Id. at 168-82, paras. 319-48.
39. Id. at 224-54, paras. 434-502.
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denberg Amendment," the multilateral treaty reservation that then formed
part of the U.S. "optional clause" declaration (a general accession to the
Court's jurisdiction, under which the case had been successfully pressed
by Nicaragua). 40 This reservation excluded jurisdiction as to "disputes
arising under a multilateral treaty, unless . . . all parties to the treaty
affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court .. 41
This meant that if the Court were to honor the reservation, it would be
required to throw out any Nicaraguan claims based on treaty law (such
as that of the United Nations Charter) unless all other parties to the treaty
"affected by the decision" were brought into the case. 42
The Court had never been faced with this reservation in such a virulent
form, since the reservation, when applied to the United Nations Charter,
is either unintelligible or surrealistic; it would have required over 157
member States to intervene successfully in the Nicaragua case in order
for the reservation not to serve as a bar to the Court's jurisdiction. 43 The
Honorary President of the American Society of International Law, Her-
bert Briggs-who earlier in his long and illustrious career actually heard
the oral arguments in the Lotus case 44 in 1927-aptly characterized the
Vandenberg Reservation in 1958 as "betray[ing] such confusion of thought
that to this day no one is quite sure what it means." 45
How does a court respond to such an extreme and extraordinary res-
ervation as the multilateral treaty reservation in its "Vandenberg" form?
One interesting approach might have been to adopt the reasoning of Judge
Lauterpacht concerning "self-judging" reservations in his separate opin-
ion in the Norwegian Loans46 case in 1957, in which he found, in the
instance of the Connally Amendment of the United States (the companion
to the Vandenberg Amendment), that "the element of legal obligation is
reduced to a vanishing point.' ' 47 In context, is this characterization not
also true of the multilateral treaty observation of the United States in the
Nicaragua case?
40. See supra note 16 for discussion of the "optional clause."
41. 39 I.C.J. Y.B. 99, 100 (1985) (emphasis added).
42. See Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 28-38, paras. 36-56.
43. Even one intervention, under the existing law and procedure of the Court, is a near
impossibility to achieve: The S.S. "Wimbledon" (Gr. Brit., Fr., It., Jap., Pol. v. Ger.)
(Intervention by Poland), 1923 P.C.1.J. (ser. A) No. I (June 28); Continental Shelf (Tunisia/
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya); Application [Malta] for Permission to Intervene, 1981 I.C.J. 3
(Apr. 14); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta); and Application [Italy] for
Permission to Intervene, 1984 I.C.J. 3 (Mar. 21).
44. The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
45. Briggs, Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 1958 RECUEIL DES COURs 229, at 307.
46. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 34, 47-55 (July 6), see also
Briggs, supra note 45, at 306-08.
47. 1957 l.C.J. 52.
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Nevertheless, the Court in the Nicaragua case did not go as far as
Judge Lauterpacht would have done; it decided to keep the case while
simultaneously giving effect to (that is to say, not disregarding) the Van-
denberg Reservation. 48 Yet it also found that the proscription against the
use of force expressed in article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter49 had passed
into customary international law that was independently binding upon
Nicaragua and the United States. 50
The Court's several important findings in the Nicaragua case will
doubtless come under hostile fire by those who are disappointed with the
decision. Had the United States been present in Court during the merits
phase, however, it doubtless could have focused the argument far more
sharply on the important issue of the nature and extent of customary
international law rules parallel to, and reflective of, the conventional rules
of the United Nations Charter. The Court's views might well have been
refined and strengthened-as well as judiciously limited, perhaps-had
the Court had the benefit of opposing arguments on this intricate point. 5'
It could also have sharpened its analysis of the key issues of the nature
and extent of intervention and justifiable self-defense in response to an
armed attack.
By appearing, the United States at least could have avoided placing
itself in the "no-win" situation that has now ensued; at most, it might
actually have prevailed on a number of these major points, or have shaped
the decision of the Court more consistently with the positions it espoused.
Instead, the United States now must say that the judgment on jurisdiction
was a nullity, stonewall the decision on the merits, veto efforts to enforce
it, and impugn the honor and the independence of the Court and its judges.
IV. Enforcement and Propriety of a Veto
The conduct of the United States before the Court creates a number
of grave concerns with regard to the United Nations Charter. The Statute
of the Court provides that "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case," 52
and that -[t]he judgment is final and without appeal." 53
The hitherto unused provision of the U.N. Charter for enforcement of
a Court judgment against a recalcitrant losing party is contained in article
94, paragraph 2:
48. See Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 31-38, paras. 42-56.
49. See supra note 36.
50. See Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 92-97, paras. 172-82.
51. Id. at 97-104, paras. 183-95.
52. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59.
53. Id. art. 60.
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If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the
Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
Nevertheless, it is not merely the second paragraph of article 94 that must
be kept in mind. Its first paragraph states: "[e]ach Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court
of Justice in any case to which it is a party." Two elements, therefore, are
present under the Charter: the obligation of a party to comply with the
judgment, and the possibility that the Security Council may enforce it.
Following the decision of the Court in June 1986, there was a stunned
silence. Nicaragua promptly sought to obtain confirmation of the Court's
decision by an appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations. 54
This attempt was vetoed by the United States on July 31, 1986. 55 On
October 21, 1986, Nicaragua again addressed the question of enforcement
of the judgment to the Security Council. 56 After discussion in several
sessions, 57 on October 28, 1986, the United States again vetoed the draft
resolution. 58 The matter has now been dealt with (albeit in a nonbinding
manner) by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on November 6,
1986, 59 that: "Urgently calls for full and immediate compliance with the
Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 . . . in
conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations ... "60
This case represents the first instance of a veto of article 94 enforcement
in the U.N. repertory of practice. No question was raised that a "no"
vote in one's own interest could be considered as inappropriate in light
54. By Letter dated June 27, 1986, from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to
the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/18187), initially
considered at the 2694th Meeting of the Security Council on July 1, 1986 (S/PV.2694).
55. S/PV.2704, July 31, 1986, at 54-55.
56. By Letter dated October 17, 1986, from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua
to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/18415), initially
considered at 41 U.N. SCOR (2715th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV.2715 (Oct. 21, 1986).
57. Oct. 22, 26, 28, 1986 U.N. Doc. S/PV.2716, S/PV.2717 and S/PV.2718 respectively.
58. U.N. SCOR (2718th mtg.) at 51, U.N. Doc. SC/4880 (Oct. 28, 1986); see N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1986, at 3, col. 4.
59. U.N. Doc. A/41/PV.53 at 92 (Nov. 6, 1986), 93 votes to 3, with 47 abstentions. The
negative votes were cast by the United States, El Salvador and Israel. Costa Rica and
Honduras, the United Kingdom and France were amongst the abstainers. Canada and
Mexico, as well as Colombia and Venezuela, voted in favor of the resolution. A/RES/41/31
(Nov. 24, 1986); see also U.N. Doc. A/41/244 (Oct. 29, 1986).
60. A/RES/41/31 at 2 (Nov. 24, 1986) (emphasis added). The resolution recites specifically,
in a preambular clause, "that Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute of the Court provides
that 'in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court' - Id. at I; this was obviously intended to counter the
argument, frequently repeated by the United States representatives, that the Court did not
have jurisdiction in the case.
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of the provisions of article 94, paragraph I of the Charter, cited above.
The United States agreed to be bound by that provision when it joined
the United Nations in 1945.
Perhaps the only way to resolve the conflict between the provisions of
article 94, paragraph I and the United States' veto of the resolution seek-
ing to enforce the Court's Nicaragua judgment is by reference to the 1925
opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice 6' in the Treaty
of Lausanne case. In that case the Permanent Court effectively set aside
the potential veto of Great Britain in a matter in which it was directly
interested, stating: "The well-known rule that no one can be judge in his
own suit holds good." 62 This "well-known rule" would appear to be just
as applicable today with regard to article 94 of the Charter as it was over
fifty years ago in the Treaty of Lausanne case.
Technically the veto of a permanent member of the Security Council
is only disallowed under the Charter in relation to matters specifically
enunciated in article 27, paragraph 3, which contains (by implication) the
"veto" power in the first place. 63 Following the maxim inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius would result in excluding any other possibilities of dis-
qualifying a negative vote in the Security Council. On the other hand,
faced with the blunt obligations of article 94, paragraph 1, it is hard to
see how the exercise of a veto could be consistent with other Charter
obligations and, therefore, valid as to the Charter.64
It is certainly still wrong for the United States to veto an enforcement
action against it, when article 94, paragraph I of the Charter is also taken
into account. The Charter should be read, and applied, as a whole. The
61. In many ways and to a great extent the "predecessor" institution to the present
International Court of Justice, although the Permanent Court was not constitutionally an
organ of the League of Nations in the same manner that the International Court is the
"principal judicial organ" of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER, art. 92. In fact, the Court
is the only United Nations organ whose role is characterized in constitutional terms. See
the illuminating discussion in Gross, The World's Empty Court House, VISTA, May-June
1970, at 24-27, especially at 26.
62. Interpretation of art. 3, para. 2, Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier Between Iraq and
Turkey), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 32 (Advisory Opinion of Nov. 21, 1925).
63. Art. 27, para. 3 provides: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
[other than 'procedural'] shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter
Vl, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."
(Italics added.) Ch. VI relates to the pacific settlement of disputes, and art. 52, para. 3
relates to the Security Council's power to refer disputes for settlement to regional organi-
zations and arrangements.
64. It could be argued that vetoing an enforcement action is technically not prohibited,
and that what is not prohibited is permitted. It can also be argued that the most that such
a veto would entail would be the breach of an obligation under another article of the Charter,
but not under art. 27.
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fact that there may be a technical defense to invalidating a veto in this
circumstance does not justify the United States' taking advantage of it
when another provision of the Charter is clearly violated and when the
principle of nemo idex in re sua, enunciated in the Lausanne precedent,
cannot be avoided.
The matter is still far from settled. A further stage of the proceedings
will evaluate damages and assess compensation. 65 Moreover, the United
States' refusal to comply with the Court's judgment in the Nicaragua
case and its subsequent vetos in the Security Council raise a number of
related and unanswered questions.
First, does not the present attitude of the U.S. Government require a
conclusion that the United States is wedded to an interpretation of the
Charter that article 94, paragraph 1 is not binding?
Second, does the United States, bound by article 94, still have a duty
to reenter the proceedings to assist the Court in the compensation phase,
and to mitigate damages? 66
Third, does the Executive Branch of the United States Government not
have a responsibility to avoid the needless accumulation of liabilities under
treaties and other international agreements?
Fourth, does not the present position of the United States reflect an
assumption that no judgment of the International Court is enforceable
against a permanent member of the Security Council? 67
Fifth, does not such a recognition of unenforceablility by an important
past supporter of the Court lead to the conclusion that the Court is hence-
forth irreversibly weakened?
Sixth, and last, is there anything that would legally prevent the United
States from reconsidering its position?
The answers to these questions are complex and thought-provoking. It
is likely that they will depart from the realm of international law and cross
the border into policy and political judgment. Yet answers must be sought
with all the intelligence and wisdom of which our policymakers are ca-
pable. International lawyers in the United States have an obligation to
reflect on these difficult questions before their answers become cast in
stone and part of our history forever.
65. Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 142-43, paras. 283-85; at 149; para. 292(15) (dispositif).
66. The Court even touched on this eventuality: "[W]hile the United States has chosen
not to appear or participate in the present phase of the proceedings, Article 53 of the Statute
does not debar it from appearing to present its arguments on the question of reparation if
it so wishes." 1986 I.C.J. at 143, para. 284.
67. Because of the possibility of that member's exercising a "veto" against any enforce-
ment action, as discussed above.
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V. Effect on the Court: the Medium- and Long-Term Future?
What is to be the impact on the International Court of Justice of the
conduct of the United States with regard to the Nicaragua case? By
defying the Court in Nicaragua, the United States has made it clear that
it may well defy the Court again. In doing so, it tends to undermine the
entire organization of which the Court is the principal judicial organ. 68
Although this may not create immediate adverse effects on the United
States, 69 the long-range policy effects are obviously grave. By seeming
to attack the Court as an institution, however, the United States' action
could precipitate and reinforce a more positive attitude toward the Court
on the part of the vast preponderance of other member States.
It may well be urged that the same type of inactivity that the Court
experienced following its decision in the South West Africa cases70 twenty
years ago will be repeated. It will be said that the Court in Nicaragua
was overly attentive to the Third World 7' and adopted an unrealistic
posture concerning the war and peace issues confronting the Western
democracies. Such accusations would be both unfortunate and unfair, as
they would ascribe an ideological position to a legal determination. Al-
though it is of course entirely possible not to agree with the Court's
determinations in the Nicaragua case, it is not necessary to base that
disagreement on a declaration that the Court is necessarily biased, and
any such declaration should only follow rigorous demonstration and con-
crete proof.
It is nonetheless inevitable that the Court and its clientele will become
increasingly sensitive to Third World States. Already a general increase
in Court traffic on the part of Third World States is apparent. 72 They are
68. U.N. CHARTER, art. 92; see supra note 61.
69. However, the possibility of third-party or collateral enforcement of the decision should
not be lightly dismissed.
70. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Aft.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6
(July 18). See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 187 (2d ed. 1979); and M. KATZ, THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 103-44 (1968).
71. If such terminology is of any real continuing usefulness and propriety, where it would
now appear to apply to the great majority of member States of the United Nations.
72. They have played a surprisingly active role even in the past two decades, in spite of
the slump following the South West Africa judgment in 1966. See for example these cases
(in addition to the Nicaragua series) involving Third World interests: Trial of Pakistani
Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 328 (Interim Protection Order of July 13), and
removal from list, id. at 347 (Order of Dec. 15); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory
Opinion of Oct. 16); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Interim
Protection Order of Sept. 11), and 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19); Interpretation of the Agreement
of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73 (Advisory Opinion of Dec.
20); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24); Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application [Malta] for Per-
mission to Intervene, 1981 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14); Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Ja-
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encouraged perhaps by the reasonably accurate perception that the Court,
in the Nicaragua case, succeeded in placing distance between its methods
and the earlier positivistic approach for which it had been so extensively
criticized in 1966 following the South West Africa decision. 73
The Court does not now find itself in a desert of inactivity, as was the
case in the years following 1966 and South West Africa. It is actually
busier today than it has been for years: the Chamber in the Mali/Burkina
Faso boundary dispute has rendered a decision;74 the United States and
Italy have submitted a case to a chamber of the Court; 75 the damages or
"reparations" phase of the Nicaragua case is still pending; 76 and an
advisory opinion has just been handed down. 77 Additionally, Nicaragua
has filed two new cases78 with the Court since the Court's Nicaragua
decision, 79 and a third (or fourth) Central American case, involving the
territorial and maritime boundary dispute between El Salvador and Hon-
duras, has also been brought.8 0
mahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta),
Application [Italy] for Permission to Intervene, 1984 l.C.J. 3 (Mar. 21); Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); Application for Revision and
Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the case concerning the Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J.
192 (Dec. 10); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) 1986 I.C.J. (Dec. 22).
73. See supra note 70; and also: "In different respects and for different reasons, the
Court was not [politically] responsive enough in the South West Africa Cases and in its
Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion and probably was overly responsive in the Namibia
Advisory Opinion." R.A. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 23 (1986).
74. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) 1986 I.C.J. (Dec. 22).
75. Elletronica Sicula S.D.A. (U.S. v. Italy); see Statement of 7 October 1985, reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 1745 (1985), and I.C.J. Communique No. 87/13 of May 27, 1987.
76. Nicaragua case, 1986 l.C.J. at 142-43, paras. 283-85, especially para. 284, & at 149,
para. 292(15) (dispositif).
77. Application for Review of Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal (Yakiemetz v. Secretary-General of the United Nations), Advisory Opinion of May
27, 1987; see I.C.J. Communique No. 87/12 of May 27, 1987.
78. See I.C.J. Communique No. 86/10 of July 29, 1986, announcing the filing of two
applications by Nicaragua on July 28, 1986, one against Costa Rica and one against Hon-
duras, each entitled "Border and Transborder Armed Actions" (Nicar. v. Costa Rica; Nicar.
v. Honduras). Both respondents have appointed agents; Honduras is expected to contest
its case on jurisdictional grounds, and Costa Rica has reserved the right to present a coun-
terclaim on the merits: see, respectively, I.C.J. Communique No. 86/11 and I.C.J. Com-
munique No. 86/12 of Sept. 3, 1986. Nicaragua's action against Costa Rica has subsequently
been withdrawn. I.C.J. Communique No. 87/21 of Aug. 19, 1987.
79. It will however be interesting, and most important, to note carefully the extent to
which (if at all) the Court's application of the principles and rules of evidence developed
in the original case of Nicaragua v. United States in 1986 will be applied, adapted, modified,
or may remain unused in these two subsequent cases, and also the extent to which (if at
all) the Court will modify or alter its interpretation of the critical legal principles as set forth
in the original Nicaragua case. See generally Highet, supra note 27; Highet, Evidence and
Proof of Facts, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 355-75 (L.
Damrosch ed. 1987).
80. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Compromis of
May 24, 1986, registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oct. 7, 1986;
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It is evident that many of the positive suggestions made over the years
for improvement of the Court appear to have seen realization in the after-
math of Nicaragua. These include the oft-repeated urging the the Court
be able to handle a greater number of cases in chambers; that the Court
seek to establish rules of procedural order in questions of factual exam-
ination and evidentiary production; that the Court be utilized more by
developing States; and that the Court not flinch from confronting difficult
questions of international polity.
In fact, the Court is now becoming increasingly busy with certain tra-
ditional and relatively limited disputes, brought in large part by special
agreement and relating to smaller States of the Third World. Chambers
are being used with increasing frequency. The Court has dealt with com-
plex facts in Nicaragua and has established new rules and approaches
for future cases. The Court has not flinched from pronouncing on issues
of serious international concern such as the security and intervention
issues presented in Nicaragua. It is hoped that a steadily increasing num-
ber of new cases will continue to come to the Court, no matter what they
involve, and no matter what their provenance.
What about the position and reaction of the United States? The fear is
that, at the end of the day, the long-held antinomy in American political
and intellectual life between what Tom Franck has called "Messianists"-
the overt internationalist idealists-and "Chauvinists-the isolationist
unilateralists-will be crystallized yet again. It may then become painfully
clear that, although the United States may well have long wished to give
a good appearance, it really never offered more than a camouflaged Chau-
vinist unilateralism. 81 Symptoms of that neo-unilateralism abound at the
present time: the U.S. refusal to sign the Law of the Sea Convention, its
withdrawal from UNESCO, its withdrawal of "optional clause" jurisdic-
tion from the Court, the adoption of mandatory U.N. withholdings, in-
creased pressure on U.N. diplomats, the entire context of the Nicaragua
case, the Grenada operation, the confrontation with Libya over maritime
rights, the bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi, the secret negotiations and
arms trading with Iran, and now the unilateral decision to "reflag" Kuwaiti
tankers in the Persian Gulf.
One may therefore anticipate some of the intricate unilateralist argu-
ments that inevitably will be made about the Nicaragua case in an effort
to soften what can only be described as the United States' revolutionary
divergence from its obligations under the Charter and Statute. These
see Order of the Court of May 8, 1987, I.C.J. Communique No. 87/9, May II, 1987 and
I.C.J. Communique No. 87/10, May 15, 1987.
8 I. See Franck, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace Through
Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 79, at 3-
18.
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arguments will no doubt include the assertion that the Court's clearly
erroneous decision in the Nicaragua case is, because of its fundamental
bias and overreaching, not truly a "decision" of the Court under article
59 of the Statute and article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter, or a "judg-
ment" of the Court under article 94, paragraph I. It is not much further
down this solipsistic path to urge that the United States was not in fact
a "party" to a "case" at all, but rather to some species of nullity. One
might also expect to hear the paroxysmic argument that the Court was
no longer the "Court" intended by the Charter and the Statute, to the
extent that it could have permitted itself to arrive at such an outrageously
incorrect opinion as the Nicaragua decision. 82
Each of these arguments, however, ignores the plain language of article
36, paragraph 6 of the Statute, "In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of
the Court."' 83 During the Security Council debates concerning enforce-
ment of the Nicaragua judgment, U.S. Ambassador Walters stated: "No
court, not even the International Court of Justice, has the legal power to
assert jurisdiction where no basis existed for that jurisdiction." 84 What
Ambassador Walters and the United States fail to acknowledge, however,
is that in 1945 the United States, by signing the Charter, agreed that the
Court, and not itself or any other single member State, would resolve any
disputes over the Court's jurisdiction. 85
In a sense we are confronted by a corollary of the story of the Oxford
philosophy examination question which asked: "Can a man be happy on
the rack? [Discuss: 2 hours.]" To this, the winning double-first candidate
replied, after thinking about it for only one hour, and then in only one
sentence: "Yes, but only if he is a very good man and it is a very bad
rack." The corollary would be: "Can a State be justified in ignoring a
judgment of the Court?" And the answer would be: "Yes, but only if it
is a very good State, and it is a very bad judgment."
What does this mean? For the State to be "good," it cannot reasonably
be argued that it has violated its international obligations; for the Court
82. As usual, Lewis Carroll expressed the problem succinctly and memorably:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different
things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 94 (1896; 1965 ed.) (emphasis added).
83. Emphasis added.
84. Security Council Meeting, Oct. 28, 1986, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718, at 46.
85. See Nicaragua case, 1986 I.C.J. at 23-24, para. 27: "Having taken part in the pro-
ceedings to argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction, the United States thereby acknowledged
that the Court had the power to make a finding on its own jurisdiction to rule upon the
merits."
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to be "bad," it must have so obviously misinterpreted the international
law it is bound to apply that substantially all informed commentators (and
not just those within the State in question) agree that its decision is grossly
erroneous. Only then could it be validly said that its decision has gone
so far beyond its jurisdiction that it is abusive, and a nullity. This "critical
level of error" should never be reached if international. law scholars are
substantially split as to the correctness of the Court's decision. (This
would follow a fortiori if that split occurs in informed opinion within the
very State contesting the correctness of the decision.)
Quite apart from the merits of the Nicaragua case, an important issue
remains concerning the effectiveness of the Court as an institution. It is
axiomatic that the Court is not a "court" at all if it is only respected by
a party when it renders a favorable judgment; otherwise it is but a panel
of convenience. Full faith and credit, the "binding force" of article 59 of
the Statute, must be accorded to unfavorable and unpopular judgments
as well as to victories. President Eisenhower put it simply and well: "It
is better to losel a point now and then in an international tribunal, and
gain a world in which everyone lives at peace under the rule of law." 86
This is precisely the example that the United States is not setting,
whether consciously or unconsciously. There is, in international life, a
priceless and fragile element of moral accountability and leadership: at
the end of the day and in the eye of history, one ounce of that leadership
outweighs a thousand tons of realpolitik.
As a matter of historical contrast to the positions currently being adopted
by the United States, in 1923 Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes87
wrote a letter to Norway enclosing a U.S. Government check for the full
amount of a more than $12 million dollars arbitral award in favor of Nor-
way, on behalf of Norwegian shipowners whose vessels had been appro-
priated by the United States during World War I. Secretary Hughes sent
the full amount of the award despite being highly critical of it, refusing
to accept that it was declaratory of international law or capable of creating
a precedent binding on the United States. The check nevertheless was
delivered as a "tangible proof of the [United States Government's]...
desire to respect arbitral awards," and of its "devotion to the principle
of arbitral settlements even in the face of a decision proclaiming certain
theories of law which it cannot accept." 88 This precept should not go
unnoted at the present time. 89
86. N.Y. Times, Dec. II, 1959, at 15, col. 4, quoted in T. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 23.
87. Later to become both a Judge of the Permanent Court from 1928 to 1930 and also
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
88. I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 344 (emphasis added).
89. See S. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 292-
95 and note 410 (1987).
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The hope remains that the Court's willpower and institutional courage
will make it clear that the Court has not been biased, and that the challenge
to its powers by the exercise of the "nonappearance technique" 90 will
be proven a losing proposition.
VI. Conclusion
In many ways, the Court is a fragile and delicate institution. Interna-
tional law itself is a fragile fabric, depending as it does on the express
and implied consent of sovereign States. The Court, as the chief inter-
preter of international law and the supreme judicial organ of the United
Nations, naturally inherits the fragility of the whole subject-matter. The
lack of specific "enforcement" powers outside the provisions of article
94,91 the willful attitude of noncompliant States, and the overall pressures
of bloc conflicts all conspire to make the institution itself vulnerable and
imperfect. Yet what other such institution do we possess?
In his poem Burnt Norton, T.S. Eliot wrote: "Human kind / Cannot
bear very much reality." Nor can the Court bear too much realism; no
institution can that is dependent on ideals and high principle. It is right,
as well as astute, to apply Pascal's wager: it must logically be better to
believe in the Court than not to believe in the Court since, if the Court
does eventually emerge as an effective institution, one's belief will have
been vindicated; whereas, if the Court's effectiveness is destroyed, it will
not ultimately matter much what one believed about it.
"Legal realism," in ways perhaps an internal contradiction in terms,
may in fact be the intellectual antithesis of the fabulous construct that we
call international law and that has, perhaps in ways not intended by its
creators or understood by its agents, become an indispensable mortar in
the walls of our civilization, for whatever it may be worth to our
grandchildren.
90. See Fitzmaurice, The Problem of the 'Non-Appearing' Defendant Government, 51
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 105; (1980); See also J.B. ELKIND, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1984); G. GUYOMAR, LE DdFAUT DES PARTIES A UN
DIFFdREND DEVANT LES JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES (1960); H.W.A. THIRLWAY, NON-
APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985); Elias, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the non-appearing respondent in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 33-66 (1983); Highet, Nonappearance
and Disappearance Before the International Court of Justice, 81 A.J.1.L. 237 (1987); Sinclair,
Some Procedural Aspects of Recent International Litigation, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 338
(1981).
91. See supra text following notes 52-53.
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